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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 
Appellant-Petitioner, Case No. 940179-CA 
v. 
CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
and MICHAEL DEAN HUMMEL, Priority No. 14 
Appellees-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND GROUNDS FOR RELIEF 
Appellee-Respondent Michael Dean Hummel ("Grievant 
Hummel"), concurs with the statement of Appellant-Petitioner 
Utah Department of Corrections ("the Department"), regarding 
the statutory jurisdictional basis for this appeal, Ap. Br. 
1. Grievant Hummel disputes that the Department is entitled 
to relief under Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4) (b), (d) , and 
(h) (iv) , as alleged by the Department. Ap. Br. 1. See, 
Argument, infra, Point II, at 15-21. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Grievant Hummel contends that the first issue designated 
by the Department, Ap. Br, 1, is not a proper issue on appeal 
because the CSRB did not hold that "a finding of unlawful 
conduct in violation of Department policy requires a criminal 
conviction", as the Department contends. See, Argument, Point 
I, infra, at 7-13. The Department may not properly appeal 
from a finding that was not made below. 
Assuming arguendo that the CSRB did make such a finding, 
which Grievant Hummel denies, the proper standard for review 
of this discretionary finding is whether it was "reasonable 
and rational", or "an abuse of discretion", giving some 
deference to the CSRB, and not whether such finding was 
"correct", as the Department asserts. Ap. Br. 1-2; See, 
Argument, Point I, infra, at 6. 
Similarly, the Department's contention that this issue 
is appropriately raised for the first time on appeal because 
the CSRB made the alleged finding at step 6, Ap. Br. 1-2, is 
improper, in that the CSRB never made the alleged finding. 
See, Argument, Point I, infra, at 7-13. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
All relevant constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues before the 
Court are contained in the parties' briefs or addenda. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS OF THE CASE 
Grievant Hummel objects to the Department's "Statement 
Of The Case" and "Statement Of Facts" in that they are 
fashioned to support the Department's arguments on appeal and 
do not provide the Court with a complete and accurate 
backdrop for the argument of the issues herein. 
Alternatively, Grievant Hummel relies on the findings of 
fact regarding the proceedings and facts of the case 
contained in the CSRB Step 5 and Step 6 decisions. Ap. Br. 
Add. D and E. Since the Department, on appeal, fails to 
challenge the CSRB's factual findings, and fails to challenge 
the CSRB's conclusion that the Department failed to show 
reversible error in any of the Step 5 hearing examiner's 
factual findings, See, "Issues Presented Upon Appeal...", Ap. 
Br. 1-2, the Step 5 factual findings, as affirmed by the CSRB 
at Step 6, Ap. Br. Add. D and E, particularly Findings No. 7-
10, at 118, should be accepted as correctly stating the 
procedural background and facts of the case for the purposes 
of appeal. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst. 846 P.2d 1282, 1287 
(Utah 1993); Rob v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Utah App. 
1993) . 
3 
SUMMARY OF APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT 
The discretionary conclusions of the CSRB that the 
Department's termination of Grievant Hummel's employment was 
without just cause, and was arbitrary, excessive and an abuse 
of the Department's discretion under the facts found by the 
CSRB, are reasonable and rational, and are supported by 
substantial evidence in the record. 
The Department's failure, on appeal, to directly and 
specifically challenge the conclusions of the CSRB at Step 6, 
including the CSRB's conclusion that the Department failed to 
show that the Step 5 hearing examiner committed reversible in 
any of the factual findings on which the Board relied at Step 
6, precludes the Department from arguing these findings in 
its brief on appeal. Accordingly, the Court should reject the 
Department's attempts to argue against these factual findings 
in their brief. 
The CSRB's conclusion that the Department was required 
to prove that Grievant Hummel was convicted of a criminal act 
when it charged him with violating Subsection 5 of the 
Department's Unlawful Conduct Policy, which requires 
"conviction of any criminal act" to establish the violation, 
is reasonable and rational, and is supported by substantial 
evidence in the record. The Department's contention that the 
CSRB held that a criminal conviction must be proved by the 
Department to establish all violations of its Unlawful 
Conduct Policy, is incorrect, and furnishes no ground for 
appeal of the CSRB's Step 6 decision. 
4 
The CSRB correctly applied the current evidentiary 
standard in reviewing the decision of its Step 5 hearing 
examiner, and correctly held that the Department's argument 
that the former "latitude and deference standard", was mooted 
by the CSRB's adoption of the current evidentiary standard 
for Step 5 hearings. 
Contrary to the Department's argument, the CSRB acted 
within its statutory rulemaking authority in adopting the 
current evidentiary standard for Step 5 hearings, and the 
Department has failed to show substantial prejudice to any 
vested right, by the CSRB's application of the current 
evidentiary standard in this case. Thus, the Department has 
no right to relief from the application of such standard in 
the instant case. 
The CSRB's conclusion that the Department's termination 
of Grievant Hummel's employment was without "just cause" and 
was "arbitrary, excessive, and an abuse of discretion", is 
reasonable, rational and supported by substantial evidence in 
the record. The Department's failure to directly challenge 
the findings of the CSRB at Step 6 that the Step 5 hearing 
examiner committed reversible error in making the factual 
findings on which these conclusion rest, preclude the 
Department from arguing the facts underlying this conclusion, 




THE CSRB PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE TERMINATION OF 
GRIEVANT HUMMEL'S EMPLOYMENT BASED UPON HIS CONVICTION 
OF A CRIMINAL ACT, WAS WITHOUT "JUST CAUSE" WHERE THE 
UNDERLYING CONVICTION HAD BEEN REVERSED AND EXPUNGED 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The question of whether an employee is appropriately 
terminated for "just cause" under agency standards, is a 
question of applying the facts to the administrative scheme 
particularly within the purview of the CSRB. Therefore, the 
CSRB's determination of this issue is discretionary, and is 
reviewed to see if it is reasonable and rational or for abuse 
of discretion, Lunnen v. Utah Dept. of Transporation, 252 
Utah Adv. Rep. 46 (Utah App. 1994); Holland v. Career Service 
Review Board. 856 P.2d 678, 681 (Utah App. 1993); Kent V. 
Dept. of Employment Security. 223 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 15 (Utah 
App. 1993), rather than for "correctness", as asserted by the 
Department. Ap. Br. 1, 16. 
B. THE CSRB'S HOLDING THAT GRIEVANT HUMMEL'S ALLEGED 
VIOLATION OF SUBSECTION 5 OF THE DEPARTMENT'S UNLAWFUL 
CONDUCT POLICY FOR "CONVICTION OF ANY CRIMINAL ACT" 
REQUIRED THE DEPARTMENT TO PROVE THE FACT OF 
CONVICTION, IS REASONABLE AND RATIONAL, AND 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
In an attempt to bring this case within the ambit of 
this Court's decision in Utah Pep't of Corrections y^ . 
Despain. 824 P.2d 439 (Utah App. 1991), the Department argues 
that the CSRB held that "a finding of unlawful conduct in 
6 
violation of the Department policy requires a criminal 
conviction." The Department then argues that the CSRB 
misapplied the law in so finding, Ap. Br. 1-2, 16-20. This 
argument is based upon a false premise because the CSRB's 
ruling concerned a narrower issue than the one posed by the 
Department. 
The CSRB held that a violation alleged under Subsection 
5 of the Department's Unlawful Conduct Policy, "for 
conviction of any criminal act1', requires the Department to 
prove the conviction of a criminal act." (Emphasis Supplied), 
Ap. Br. Add. 107. The CSRB did not hold that alleged 
violations of the Unlawful Conduct Policy under other 
subsections of the Policy, or the Act in general, require 
evidence of a criminal conviction, and the Department fails 
to cite any authority to show that the CSRB made such a 
ruling. Ap. Br. 16-20. 
It is undisputed that Grievant Hummel had a duty to be 
familiar with Department policies and procedures, and that a 
violation of the Department's Unlawful Conduct Policy could 
provide a basis for the termination of his merit employment 
under circumstances amounting to "just cause." Ap. Br. at 10-
11 . 
Even so, the Department had the duty, in accordance with 
the requirements of fundamental fairness and due process to 
observed in the termination of career service employees, to 
afford Grievant Hummel reasonably specific notice of the 
factual conduct alleged to constitute a violation of its 
7 
Unlawful Conduct Policy, and to prove such conduct under the 
applicable evidentiary standards, in order to establish the 
alleged violation and the "just cause" for the termination of 
his employment based upon such violation. Tolman v. Salt Lake 
County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah App. 1991); Kent. 
supra, at 15. 
The Department concedes that the only fact it alleged to 
support Grievant Hummel's alleged violation of its Unlawful 
Conduct Policy, was the fact of Grievant's conviction of a 
criminal act under Subsection 5 of the Policy. Ap. Br. 10-12. 
The Department further acknowledges that following the 
reversal and expungement of the conviction, "this fact no 
longer exists," Ap. Br. Add. G at 6. (Emphasis in original) 
Therefore, whatever other facts of alleged "criminal conduct" 
the Department presented before its ALJ, or before the CSRB 
hearing examiner at Step 5, Grievant Hummel could not be 
lawfully terminated for his alleged violation of the Unlawful 
Conduct Policy, based on facts other than those alleged to 
support the violation by the Department in the Notice of 
Termination, without violating Grievant Hummelfs due process 
rights. Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 28 
(Utah App. 1991); Kent. supra, at 15. 
The Department argues that it was not required to prove 
that Grievant Hummel was convicted of a criminal offense to 
establish the violation of its Unlawful Conduct Policy as 
alleged by the Department by virtue of this Court's decision 
in Utah Department of Corrections v. Despain, 824 P.2d 439 
8 
(Utah App. 1991). Ap. Br. 12-13 This argument sweeps too 
broadly and ignores important distinctions between the facts 
and the legal issues presented in Despain and the case at 
bar. 
The Department contends that "Despain, a correctional 
officer, was administratively charged—under the identical 
provision charged against Hummel—with unlawful conduct for 
assaulting his former wife." Ap. Br. 12-13. This is 
incorrect. The Department did not charge Grievant Hummel 
with any specific conduct alleged to violate its Unlawful 
Conduct Policy, but relied solely on the fact of his 
conviction under Subsection 5 of the Unlawful Conduct Policy, 
specifying "conviction of any criminal act", as the factual 
basis for Grievant Hummel's alleged violation of the Policy. 
By contrast, Officer Despain was not charged under 
Subsection 5 of the Unlawful Conduct Policy, because he was 
never charged or convicted of assaulting his wife, as the 
Department concedes. Despain, 824 P.2d at 444. Instead, 
Despain was charged with several items of specific conduct, 
including assaulting his wife, in violation of the Unlawful 
Conduct Policy. See, Id. 
Since Officer Despain was never charged under 
Subsection 5 of the Unlawful Conduct Policy, for "conviction 
of any criminal act", this Court had no occasion to consider 
in Despain. much less decide, whether a career service 
employee could be terminated under Subsection 5 of the 
Unlawful Conduct Policy based upon the "conviction of a 
9 
criminal act11 where the predicate conviction had been legally 
reversed and expunged during the pendency of the employee's 
appeal regarding the termination of his merit employment. 
Although the Department dismisses the reversal and 
expungement of Grievant Hummel's plea and conviction as a 
mere "technicality11, Ap. Br. 10, the CSRB's recognition that 
the reversal and expungement of Grievant Hummel's conviction 
preclude its use as evidence for the alleged violation of the 
Department's Unlawful Conduct Policy, See, "The Board's 
Appellate Conclusions", No. 19, Ap. Br. Add. 121, the CSRB's 
ruling on this issue is consonant with the decisions of Utah 
appellate courts regarding the nonuse of expunged convictions 
as evidence. Poe v. Utah Department of Public Safety, 782 
p.2d 489 (Utah 1989); Ambus v. Utah State Board of Education, 
800 P.2d 811 (Utah 1990). 
The Unlawful Conduct Policy provides that the conduct 
prohibited under its provisions "includes, but is not limited 
to: 
1. the misuse or unauthorized possession 
and/or use of State property or the property 
of any person, including the theft, 
distribution, destruction or damage of such 
property; 
2. the unauthorized use or distribution, 
including the falsification, modification, or 
destruction, of any State regord or document; 
3. the unauthorized distribution or disclosure 
of confidential, private or privileged 
information; 
10 
4. inducing or directing any member in the 
State service or any other person to commit 
any act which constitutes a wrongful practice, 
including threatening, coercing or harassing 
any person or the giving or receiving of money 
or any other goods, services or considerations 
in exchange for personal gain except where 
such practices are lawfully provided; or 
5. the conviction of any criminal act." 
(Emphasis supplied) (Ap. Br. Add. A) 
Reference to the foregoing text of the Unlawful Conduct 
Policy demonstrates that an employee could be charged with a 
violation of its provisions without requiring the Department 
to prove the "conviction of a criminal act", unless the 
employee is specifically charged under Subsection 5 of the 
Policy, which plainly requires a criminal conviction. 
In the instant case, the CSRB simply held that where the 
Department predicated Grievant Hummel's alleged violation of 
its Unlawful Conduct policy solely the fact of Grievant 
Hummel's "conviction of any criminal act" under Subsection 5 
of the Unlawful Conduct Policy, and his conviction had been 
subsequently reversed and expunged, the non-existent 
conviction could not support the alleged violation of the 
Unlawful Conduct Policy as a matter of law. "The matter of 
law subsumes the question of evidentiary proof." See, CSRB 
Conclusion of Law #19, Ap. Br. Add. 121. 
In discussing this conclusion, the CSRB observes that it 
has no statutory jurisdiction over criminal cases, and hence 
cannot convict a career service employee of a criminal act. 
The CSRB goes on to hold that where a court of competent 
1 1 
jurisdiction has entered a criminal conviction against an 
employee, the CSRB will treat the court's determination as 
dispositive for purposes of the termination of an employee 
pursuant to Subsection 5 of the Department's unlawful conduct 
policy. Ap. Br. Add. 107. 
The CSRB's interpretation is consistent with that of the 
Department's ALJ, who offered the following legal conclusion 
at Step 4 of the Grievance Procedure, after Grievant Hummel 
had entered a plea to the charge of child abuse as part of a 
plea bargain, but before the plea and resulting conviction 
had been overturned by the district court 
Mr. Hummel's guilty plea constitutes a 
conviction. The propriety of that conviction 
has been litigated in the courts. It may not 
be re-litigated in this forum. The conviction 
establishes a violation of AE 02/03.37 A(5), 
Unlawful Conduct - Mr. Hummel's statement to 
Detective Collins that he slapped the victim 
hard enough to leave a bruise, in this 
examiner's view, establishes a violation of 
76-5-109, U.C.A. The reference made by the 
Department to alleged abuse in August of 1979 
and November 1988 do nothing to establish the 
charge as filed by the Department. Neither 
allegation resulted in a conviction. 
(Emphasis supplied) (Ap. Br. Add. at 276). 
The foregoing finding demonstrates that the Department's 
own ALJ interpreted Subsection 5 of the Unlawful Conduct 
Policy to mean that mere allegations of child abuse which did 
not result in a conviction "do nothing to establish the 
charge as filed by the Department", where the fact of 
conviction was specifically alleged as the basis for the 
violation of the Policy. Ap. Br. Add. at 276. Thus, once 
12 
Grievant Hummel's conviction was reversed, it could not 
support his alleged violation of Subsection 5 of the Unlawful 
Conduct Policy as a matter of law. 
Finally, the Department's argument that the CSRB's 
ruling that the Department failed to prove that Grievant 
Hummel violated the Unlawful Conduct Policy under the unique 
facts of this case constitutes "defiance" of this Court's 
decision in Despain. Ap. Br. 13, attributes improper motives 
to the CSRB, is not supported by any evidence in the record, 
and should be disregarded by the Court. Smith v. Cook, 714 
P.2d 296 (Utah 1986); Koulis v. Standard Oil Co.. 746 P.2d 
1182 (Utah App. 1987). 
Since Subsection 5 of the Unlawful Conduct policy spec-
ifically requires the conviction of any criminal act, the 
Department is required to prove the fact of the criminal 
conviction. Having failed to do so, because the criminal 
conviction was reversed and expunged, the decision of the 
CSRB that the termination of Grievant Hummel's employment 
based on the "fact" of his conviction was without "just 
cause", is reasonable and rational, supported by substantial 
evidence, and should be affirmed. 
13 
POINT II 
THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD CORRECTLY APPLIED 
THE CURRENT EVIDENTIARY STANDARD IN REVIEWING THE 
DECISION OF THE HEARING EXAMINER AT STEP 5 OF THE 
GRIEVANCE PROCESS 
From July 1, 1987, through December 14, 1991, the CSRB 
applied a "latitude and deference" standard in reviewing 
appeals from the decisions of CSRB hearing examiners at Step 
5 of the grievance process. Ap. Br. 16. 
In late 1991, the CSRB changed its evidentiary standard 
from "latitude and deference" to "latitude and 
consideration." Ap. Br. at 16. This standard became effective 
on December 15, 1991, and was applicable at the time Grievant 
Hummel's Step 5 hearing commenced on August 11, 1992. R. 373-
374. 
Meanwhile, in May, 1992, the CSRB began the amending 
process for adoption of the current evidentiary standard for 
Step 5 hearings, contained in R137-1-20C. 1 , and Step Six 
hearings, contained in R137-1-21D, Aplee. Add. 1, which 
became effective on November 2, 1992. The current Step 5 
standard contained in R137-20C.1 provides: 
The CSRB hearing officer shall first make 
factual findings based solely on the evidence 
at the hearing without deference to any prior 
factual findings of the agency. The CSRB 
hearing examiner then determines whether: "(a) 
the factual findings made from the evidentiary 
step 5 hearing support with substantial 
evidence the allegations made by the agency... 
and, (b) the agency has correctly applied 
relevant policies, rules, and statutes. 
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Although the Step 5 hearing examiner had been informed 
that the "latitude and consideration" standard had become 
effective prior to Grievant Hummel ' s Step 5 hearing, he 
decided to apply the old "latitude and deference" standard in 
his deliberations, even though most of the Step 5 hearing 
occurred after the current Step 5 evidentiary standard became 
effective on November 2, 1992. See, Step 5 Decision, Ap. Br., 
Add. D, at 1, 21. 
When the CSRB reviewed the Step 5 decision at Step 6, it 
held that the current evidentiary standard was the 
appropriate standard for Step 5 and Step 6 hearings, and 
should be applied in the determination of Grievant Hummel's 
Step 5 appeal. See, "Appellate Conclusions of The Board, No. 
5, Ap. Br. Add. E, at 118. 
The CSRB also concluded at Step 6 that the Department's 
argument that the Step 5 hearing examiner should have applied 
a "latitude and deference" standard, was "moot" because of 
the CSRB's adoption of the current evidentiary standard for 
Step 5 hearings. See, "The Board's Appellate Conclusions", 
No. 20, Ap. Br. Add. E, at 121. On appeal, the Department 
does not directly challenge the "mootness" finding, See, 
"Issues On Appeal...", Ap. Br. 1-2, and therefore has waived 
the issue. Therefore, the CSRB's ruling on this issue should 
be affirmed. State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359 n.1 (Utah App. 
1993) . 
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A. THE CSRB DID NOT EXCEED ITS STATUTORY AUTHORITY IN 
ADOPTING THE CURRENT STEP 5 EVIDENTIARY STANDARD 
1. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The Department of Corrections argues that the CSRB's 
current evidentiary standards for Step 5 hearings exceed the 
the CSRB's statutory authority, Ap. Br. at 21-23. This Court 
applies an "abuse of discretion" standard in determining 
whether the CSRB exceeded its statutory authority in adopting 
the current Step 5 evidentiary standard. See, Kent, supra, at 
16, n.3, referring to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16 (4) (h) (i) , 
(Supp. 1989), Aplee. Add. 2. 
The Court also reviews this argument under the standard 
set forth in Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16 (1 ) (Supp. 1989), 
Aplee. Add. 2, which provides that "... the Court of Appeals 
has jurisdiction to review all final agency actions resulting 
from formal adjudicative proceedings." Subsection (4)(b) of 
the statute further provides that 
The appellate court shall grant relief only 
if, on the basis of the agency's record, it 
determines that the person seeking judicial 
review has been substantially prejudiced by 
any of the following: (a) omitted; (b) the 
agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction 
conferred by statute... 
Under this statute, the agency's alleged error must 
"substantially prejudice" the petitioner before the Court may 
grant relief. Adams v. Board of Review of Indus. Com'n, 821 
P.2d 1, 7 (Utah App. 1991) . 
In this case, the Department fails to demonstrate (1) 
that the Department has exceeded its statutory authority, or 
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(2) that the Department has been "substantially prejudiced" 
as the result thereof. Accordingly, the Department's request 
for relief on this ground should be denied. 
2. THE CSRB ACTED WITHIN ITS STATUTORY AUTHORITY IN 
APPLYING THE CURRENT EVIDENTIARY STANDARD IN 
DECIDING OFFICER HUMMEL'S PENDING GRIEVANCE 
Under Utah Code Ann. §67-19-203(6) (Supp. 1993), Aplee. 
Add. 3, the Utah Legislature has specifically conferred upon 
the CSRB rulemaking authority governing "procedures in 
jurisdictional and evidentiary hearings, unless governed by 
Title 63, Chapter 46b of the Administrative Procedures Act." 
Kent v. Dept. Of Employment Security. 223 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 
15 (Utah App. 1993). Significantly, the Department does not 
challenge the CSRB's conclusion that the "internal personnel 
actions within an agency concerning its own employees, or 
judicial review of those actions", as is involved in this 
case, is excluded from coverage of the UAPA under §63-46b-
1 (2) (e) of the UAPA. See, "the Board's Appellate 
Conclusions", No. 3, Ap. Br. Add. at 117. Therefore, the CSRB 
acted within its statutory rulemaking authority in adopting 
the current Step 5 evidentiary standard. 
Contrary to the Department of Corrections' contention, 
Ap. Br. 21-23, there is no necessary or inherent 
inconsistency between the CSRB's statutory powers, as 
provided in Utah Code Ann. §67-19a-202 (Supp. 1993), Ap. Br. 
21, and the Department's discretion to dismiss career service 
employees pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §67-19-18 et. seq., Ap. 
Br. at 20. 
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Although Utah Code Ann. §67-19-18(5) (Supp. 1993), 
Aplee. Add. 3, vests discretion in the head of the Department 
of Human Resource Management ("DHRM") or designated 
representatives in state administrative agencies, to dismiss 
career service employees subject to limited due process 
requirements, Ap. Br. at 20-21, such discretion "must be 
exercised within appropriate legal boundaries." Kent, supra, 
at 15, quoting, Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 
23, 26 (Utah App. 1991). 
In this case, the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §67-19-18 
(1) and (2)(5)(a), (Supp. 1991), Aplee. Add. 4, circumscribe 
the authority of the Department of Corrections to dismiss 
career service employees, including Grievant Hummel, except 
for "just cause", based upon merit related conduct, after due 
process. "Whether an employee is appropriately terminated for 
"just cause" under agency standards, is a question of 
applying the facts to the administrative scheme within the 
purview of the CSRB." Despain, supra, 175 Utah Adv. Rep. 57, 
59. 
The Department fails to demonstrate how the CSRB has 
exceeded its statutory authority in adopting the current 
evidentiary standard for Step 5 hearings. Even assuming that 
consistent with §67-19-5(e), "the CSRB must affirm the 
Department's decision if it is within the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality", Kent, supra, at 15, Ap. Br. 
21-22, there is nothing in Utah Code Ann. §67-19-18, Aplee. 
Add. 4, precluding the CSRB from employing current 
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evidentiary standard in determining whether an administrative 
agency had "just cause" for dismissing an employee 
"within the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Kent. 
supra, at 15. 
In Kent , supra, this Court acknowledged the right of 
state agencies, including the CSRB, to modify their 
evidentiary hearing standards. There, the employee 
Greivant was dismissed by Job Service and his dismissal was 
sustained at Step 5 by the CSRB hearing officer and at Step 
Six by the Board. The Grievant employee appealed to this 
Court on October 16, 1992, before the current Step 5 
evidentiary standard became effective on November 2, 1992. 
Since this standard did not become law until after the 
appeal in Kent , supra, the Court of Appeals chose not to 
apply it retroactively in that case. However, the Court 
recognized that the CSRB had changed its evidentiary 
standards in 1991 and cited those standards in its 1991 
decision in Kent. The Court did not cite the CSRB' s former 
1987 Step 6 standard of review (26.8.2). Instead, the Court 
five times cited its 1991 version at R137-21D. Aplee. Add. 1.1 
1 By 1991, the State's Division of Administrative Rulemaking 
had assigned Agency rule numbers and CSRB's first designation 
was Rule 140, which was later changed to the current R137 
agency rulemaking number. See, Despain. supra, at 62, n.5. 
19 
In Melis et al. v. Department of Social Services, 656 
P.2d 998 (Utah 1982), the issue was what law governed the 
grievance process rights of the parties: the Grievance 
Procedure Act which was in effect at the time of the filing; 
the Legislature's enactment of a new Grievance Act, which 
repealed the former Grievance Act; or a new statutory 
amendment to the process which passed while the case was 
pending. Id. at 100-1002. 
In Melis, supra, the Court held that procedural statutes 
enacted subsequent to the initiation of a suit which do not 
enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights, 
apply not only to future actions, but also to accrued and 
pending actions, but generally do not affect cases which have 
already been completed prior to the enactment of such 
statutes. Id. 
The instant case is similar to Melis. The Department of 
Corrections has no vested or contractual right to the 
application of a particular evidentiary standard in the Step 
5 CSRB proceedings. The CSRB created the "latitude and 
deference" standard by administrative rulemaking, and the 
CSRB retained the power to change or repeal the standard, and 
to adopt the current standard. 
The fact that this Court applied the "latitude and 
deference" standard in Despain , does not afford the 
Department a vested right to have that standard applied in 
all future cases, or deprive the CSRB of its statutory power 
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to provide the procedures for evidentiary hearings under its 
jurisdiction. 
3. THE CSRB DID NOT RETROACTIVELY APPLY THE CURRENT 
STEP 5 EVIDENTIARY STANDARD IN DECIDING OFFICER 
HUMMEL1S GRIEVANCE 
The CSRB's adoption of the current evidentiary standard 
for Step 5 hearings, was a procedural change "providing a 
different mode or form of procedure for enforcing substantive 
rights1', Pilcher v. State. 663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1983). 
Contrary to the Department's argument, Ap. Br. at 23-28, 
the CSRB's current evidentiary standard for Step 5 hearings 
does not affect any substantive or vested rights of the 
Department under Utah Code Ann. §67-19-18. Ap. Br. 16-26. 
The current evidentiary standard provides that a CSRB 
Step 5 hearing "shall be a new hearing for the record, held 
de novo, with both parties being granted full administrative 
due process." Ap. Br. at 16. Under this procedure, both the 
Department and the Grievant are afforded an equal opportunity 
to present evidence to an independent hearing examiner on the 
issues relating to the dismissal. Therefore, the Department 
cannot and has not shown that it is "substantially 
prejudiced" by the current Step 5 evidentiary procedural 
standard. Accordingly, the CSRB's application of the current 
evidentiary standard to the Step 5 hearing is appropriate and 
should be affirmed. 
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POINT III 
THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD'S HOLDING THAT 
THE DEPARTMENT'S SANCTION OF TERMINATION WAS 
ARBITRARY, EXCESSIVE, AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, 
IS REASONABLE AND RATIONAL, AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The CSRB's decision that the Department's sanction of 
termination was arbitrary, excessive, and constituted an 
abuse of discretion, involves applying the CSRB's rules to 
the facts and is reviewed for reasonableness and rationality 
or abuse of discretion, giving some deference to the CSRB. 
Holland V. Career Service Review Board. 856 P.2d 678, 681 
(Utah App. 1993); Kent v.Dept. of Employment Security, 223 
Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 15 (Utah App. 1993) 
B. THE CSRB'S DECISION THAT THE DEPARTMENT'S TERMINATION 
OF GRIEVANT HUMMEL'S EMPLOYMENT WAS ARBITRARY, EXCES-
SIVE AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, IS REASONABLE AND 
RATIONAL, AND SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN 
THE RECORD 
1. THE DEPARTMENT'S FAILURE, ON APPEAL, TO CHALLENGE 
THE FINDINGS OF THE CSRB THAT THE DEPARTMENT HAD FAILED 
TO SHOW THAT THE STEP 5 HEARING EXAMINER COMMITTED 
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ANY FACTUAL FINDINGS, PRECLUDES 
THE DEPARTMENT FROM CHALLENGING THE CSRB'S CONCLUSION 
THAT THE TERMINATION OF GRIEVANT HUMMEL'S EMPLOYMENT 
WAS ARBITRARY, EXCESSIVE, AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
BASED UPON THE UNDERLYING FACTS 
On appeal, the Department does not directly challenge 
the findings and conclusions of the CSRB that the Department 
failed to "marshal the evidence" at Step 6 to show that the 
Step 5 hearing examiner had committed reversible error in any 
of the factual findings which the CSRB adopted as a basis for 
its conclusion that the Department's termination of Grievant 
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Hummel1s employment, was without "just cause" and was 
arbitrary, disproportionate and an abuse of discretion. See, 
"Issues Presented On Appeal . ..", Ap. Br. 1-2; See also, "The 
Board's Appellate Conclusions", Nos. 1, 7-18, Ap. Br. Add. E, 
at 117-121. Thus, the Department's efforts to challenge 
the factual findings of the Step 5 hearing examiner, as 
affirmed by the CSRB Board, albeit under the guise of 
attempting to support the Department's arguments that the 
Step 5 hearing examiner failed to afford the Department 
"latitude and deference", Ap. Br. 28-38, and that the CSRB 
"erred in holding the Department's sanction of termination 
unreasonable", Ap. Br. 38-48, is improper and should be 
rejected by this Court on appeal. Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 
1322, 1328 (Utah App. 1993). 
The marshaling requirement "serves the important 
function of reminding the litigants and appellate courts of 
the broad deference owed to the finder of fact at trial." 
Woodward v. Fazzio. 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1991). "A 
reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly 
defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a 
depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden 
of argument and research." Id. {quoting State v. Bishop, 753 
P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988). 
Having failed to show that the Step 5 hearing 
examiner committed reversible error in the factual findings 
affirmed by the CSRB at Step 6, the Department should not be 
permitted to challenge the factual basis for the CSRB's 
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conclusions that the Department's termination of Grievant 
Hummel's employment was arbitrary, excessive and an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359 n.1 (Utah App. 
1993)• 
2. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE CONCLUSION 
THAT THE DEPARTMENT'S TERMINATION OF GRIEVANT 
HUMMEL1S EMPLOYMENT WAS ARBITRARY, EXCESSIVE, 
AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, UNDER THE FACTS 
FOUND AT STEP 5 AND AFFIRMED BY THE CSRB AT 
STEP 6. 
In concluding that the sanction of termination was 
arbitrary, excessive and disproportionate, the CSRB at Step 6 
first affirmed and relied on the Step 5 hearing examiner's 
finding that there was no evidence to support the 
Department's charge against Grievant Hummel for violation of 
Subsection 5 of its Unlawful Conduct Policy for "conviction 
of any criminal act", where the underlying conviction had 
been reversed. Ap. Br. Add. E, at 107, 112. 
As to the other two charges alleged to justify the 
termination of Grievant Hummel's employment: Grievant 
Hummel's alleged failure to report, and Grievant's alleged 
"bringing disrespect to the Department", the CSRB affirmed 
and relied on the Step 5 hearing examiner's finding of 
mitigating circumstances which rendered Mr. Hummel's alleged 
conduct less serious, and therefore, deserving of a lesser 
punishment than termination, particularly when measured 
against the punishment meted out to other officers by the 
Department for similar or more serious offenses. See, "The 
Board's Appellate Conclusions, Nos. 11-18; Ap. Br. Add. E, at 
108-112; 119-121. Since the Department failed to prove at 
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Step 6 that these factual findings constituted reversible 
error, See, "Board's Appellate Conclusions" Nos. 7-10, Ap. 
Br. Add. E, at 118-119, such findings must be deemed to be 
substantial evidence supporting the CSRB's conclusions that 
the termination of Grievant's employment was arbitrary, 
excessive and an abuse of discretion. See, "Board's Appellate 
Conclusions", Nos. 11-17, Ap. Br. Add. E, at 119-121. 
In addition to the foregoing, the CSRB also affirmed and 
relied upon the Step 5 hearing examiner's findings that, 
prior to terminating Grievant Hummel's employment, the 
Department had already unlawfully suspended Grievant Hummel 
for four months without pay, without any notice or hearing, 
for the same conduct alleged to justify the termination of 
his employment, See, "The Board's Appellate Conclusions", 
No. 1, Ap. Br. Add. E, at 117. The CSRB also relied on the 
Step 5 hearing examiner's finding that after being forced to 
reinstate him under the threat of legal action, the 
Department retaliated against Grievant Hummel by forcing him 
to perform the duties of his employment in degrading and 
punishing circumstances. See, Ap. Br. Add. at 113. 
Since there is no authority under the Department's 
regulations or state law for the Department to administer 
cruel or successive punishments on Grievant Hummel for the 
same offense without due process of law, and the Department 
does not contest that its prolonged suspension of Grievant 
Hummel's employment was illegal, such facts constitute 
substantial evidence in the record supporting the CSRB's 
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conclusion that the termination of Grievant Hummel's 
employment in addition to the foregoing adverse actions was 
arbitrary, excessive, and an abuse of the Department's 
discretion. See, "Board's Appellate Conclusions", Nos. 11-17, 
Ap. Br. Add. E, at 119-121. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 67-19-203(6) (Supp. 1993), 
the CSRB has been granted rulemaking authority over 
"procedures in jurisdictional and evidentiary hearings, 
unless governed by Title 63, Chapter 46b of the 
Administrative Procedures Act." Kent v. Dept. Of Employment 
Security. 223 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 15 (Utah App. 1993). The 
CSRB at Step 6 correctly found, and the Department does not 
contest its finding, that "Internal personnel actions within 
an agency concerning its own employees, or judicial review of 
those actions", as is involved in this case, are excluded 
from coverage under Title 63, Chapter 46b of the UAPA." Ap. 
Br. Add. Conclusion 3, at 117. Therefore, the CSRB acted 
within its statutory rulemaking authority in adopting the 
current Step 5 evidentiary standard for Step 5 hearings. 
The factual findings of the Step 5 hearing examiner 
which were unsuccessfully challenged by the Department and 
affirmed by the CSRB at Step 6, provide substantial evidence 
to support the CSRB's Step 6 conclusions that the 
Department's termination of Grievant Hummel's employment was 
"without just cause" and was "arbitrary, excessive and an 
abuse of discretion." 
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The Department has failed to prove that the CSRB at Step 
6 abused its discretion in making the foregoing conclusions, 
and that such conclusions are not reasonable, rational and 
supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, Grievant 
Hummel respectfully requests the Court to affirm the Step 6 
decision of the Career Service Review Board and to deny the 
Department's request for reinstatement of its order 
terminating Grievant Hummel's employment-
DATED thisrp th day of Dece, 
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